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1 Introduction
The literature on international environmental agreements gives reasons
to be pessimistic about the prospects for an eﬀective international cli-
mate agreement with broad participation and deep emission reductions.
Incentives for free-riding are significant, while stable coalitions tend to be
small. For example, see Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993),
and Hoel (1992). Moreover, after more than 15 years of negotiations, an
eﬀective international climate agreement is far from reality. After the
withdrawal of the USA, the Kyoto Protocol will not provide significant
emissions reductions, cf. Böhringer (2002), and others. At the same
time, the negotiations on a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol
have showed slow progress during recent years.
With poor prospects for comprehensive international cooperation for
climate control, the world may converge towards a non-cooperative equi-
librium. That would imply ineﬃciently small abatement eﬀorts that are
ineﬃciently allocated across countries. 1
Therefore, an important question is whether the eﬃciency of the
non-cooperative solution can be improved by integration (linking) of
national permit markets into a single international market. Such an
integration would imply that abatement eﬀorts are eﬃciently allocated
across countries. Stern (2006), and a number of other studies, for exam-
ple, see Anger (2006), Blyth and Bosi (2004), Ellis and Tirpak (2006),
and IETA (2006), recommend this type of international cooperation.
However, surprisingly enough, these studies ignore how such linking of
national permit markets would influence national governments’ incen-
tives.
In contrast to these studies, Helm (2003) took seriously the idea
that international trading will alter national governments’ incentives.
Helm’s starting point is that there is no "central authority with the power
to determine the initial allocations of tradable allowances. Hence, the
allocation is chosen by interdependent, yet sovereign, states, and the
possibility of trading will aﬀect their allowance choices" (Helm, 2003,
pp. 2737—2738).
1Hoel (2005) points to a third source of ineﬃciency of uncoordinated policies.
If governments apply emission taxes in a non-cooperative game, then they have in-
centives to diﬀerentiate these taxes across sectors to influence emissions in other
countries through the eﬀect on international trade. Hence, Hoel (2005) concludes
that a non-cooperative equilibrium, where all countries use tradable permits as their
domestic environmental policy instead of taxes, may be a better solution, as this
solution would avoid this third source of ineﬃciency. Hoel’s point is that if all
other countries apply quotas, then their emissions are fixed, and consequently, the
argument for diﬀerentiated taxes is removed.
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Therefore, the question is whether international emissions trading
will increase total allocation, and consequently, reduce the total abate-
ment. Helm (2003) concludes that the overall eﬀect on emissions is am-
biguous and states that "emissions in a regime with allowance trading
may exceed those in a regime without trading" (Helm, 2003, p. 2742).
This paper further investigates the non-cooperative equilibrium with
linked permit markets. Our conclusions diﬀer from Helm’s conclusions
in a number of points. Most important, we find that the normal case will
be that international trading will lead to higher emissions. Althouhg
there may be exceptions to this, we basically conclude that international
emissions trading gives incentive structures that, in total, lead in the
direction of increased emissions.
The reason why we draw a stronger conclusion than Helm at this
point is related to the observation that the size of the countries involved
is likely to vary considerably, and that the benefits from abatement and
some characteristics of the abatement cost functions will vary in a sys-
tematic way between large and small countries. We find that trading
will give small countries incentives for more generous allocations, while
large countries will have a tendency to reduce their number of allocated
permits. However, the smaller countries’ incentives towards more gen-
erous allocations more than outweigh the larger countries’ incentives for
tightening their allocations.
It follows that large countries are likely to lose if they link their
domestic permit markets to the permit markets of smaller countries.
Therefore, large countries may, after all, be less willing to be involved in
such linking processes.
Helm concludes that even in cases where "emissions are higher with
trading, the welfare of each individual country may improve due to eﬃ-
ciency gains on the permit market". We find that this is not possible,
and that not all countries will be better oﬀ in cases with increased total
emissions due to trading. For example, in the two country case, increased
emissions necessarily implies that one of these countries would be worse
oﬀ with trading.
The other main question is, how international emissions trading af-
fects eﬃciency. Because abatement in the unlinked case is ineﬃciently
low, Helm (2003) finds that eﬃciency may be reduced when permit
markets are linked. This corresponds with our findings. We applied two
models in this work. In the most general model, we found that the ef-
fect on eﬃciency was ambiguous. However, within the more restrictive
theoretical model, we found that eﬃciency was always reduced through
linking of national permit markets.
Due to both the result that large countries are likely to lose from link-
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ing and that overall eﬃciency may be reduced, we conclude that linking
of national permit markets may turn out to be less important than was
concluded in studies such as Anger (2006), Blyth and Bosi (2004), Ellis
and Tirpak (2006), and IETA (2006). These studies ignored how linking
of permit markets would influence the governments’ incentives to revise
their respective allocations. Hence, their conclusions that there are al-
ways eﬃciency gains from linking of national permit markets relies on a
challengeable assumption on governments’ behavior.
An analysis of how incentives are aﬀected by integration of national
permit markets is relevant to the current political situation. In recent
years, a number of national governments, and some state governments in
the US, are designing and/or implementing national abatement policies
on a unilateral basis. Recently, it has been considered to be a promising
opportunity to link national emissions trading schemes. For example,
the EU ETS and the emerging ETS in California and other US states.
Moreover, a number of north-eastern states in the US are planning to link
their planned state-based ETS from 2009 under the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI). Stern (2006) recommends this type of linking.
The next section provides an introduction to this work’s main results
using graphs to illustrate the two country case. The subsequent section
takes an analytical approach, and deals with the n-country case and
presents the main results. The final section provides a conclusion.
2 An introduction to the model and the main re-
sults
Consider two countries. Both cause emissions of a transboundary pol-
lutant. Abatement is considered to be a pure collective good. Marginal
abatement costs are linearly increasing. The lines Beo1 and Be
o
2 shown
in Figure 1 denote the marginal abatement costs of country 1 and 2,
respectively. Country 2 has a steeper marginal abatement cost curve
than Country 1 does.
To make the model tractable, we make the simplifying and commonly
applied assumption that these countries have constant marginal benefits
from abatement equal to bi, see Figure 1. Moreover, we assume that
Country 1 has higher marginal benefits from abatement than Country 2
does.
The assumptions made so far may be interpreted that Country 1 is
larger than Country 2. To see that larger countries, as a general rule,
have higher benefits from abatement than smaller countries do, consider
two equally-sized countries that are merged into a single country. The
benefits of abatement of the new, larger country will be the sum of the
benefits to the two former, smaller countries.
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Figure 1: A two-country case with increased emissions from linking. e∗∗1
and e∗∗2 are Pareto-eﬃcient emission levels. Qu1 and Qu2 are allocations
in the non-linked equilibrium, while Q∗1 and Q
∗
2 are allocations in the
linked equilibrium
In the case described in Figure 1 the large country has a flatter
marginal abatement cost curve compared to the smaller country. As
aggregation of marginal cost curves always gives less steep curves (due
to horizontal summation), it is reasonable that the smaller Country 2
has a steeper marginal abatement cost curve compared to the larger
Country 1.
The two countries could establish a Pareto-eﬃcient agreement. In
that case, abatement in both countries is set at the levels where the
marginal abatement costs are equal to the sum of the two countries’
marginal benefits of abatement. That would give the emission levels e∗∗1
and e∗∗2 , as indicated in Figure 1. However, an ambitious international
climate agreement may be diﬃcult to establish due to the well-known
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Figure 2: Linking of two countries’ permit markets with permit alloca-
tions as in the unlinked case. Because the the area of rectangle B is
bigger than the area of paralellogram A, country 2 would be better oﬀ
increasing its allocation.
result that stable coalitions are small and the strong incentives for free-
riding. Therefore, we studied non-cooperative equilibria only.
If there are two unlinked, competitive domestic permit markets within
each of the two countries, then the two governments would maximize na-
tional welfares by issuing Qu1 and Q
u
2 emissions permits, respectively, see
Figure 1. The permit prices would settle at the levels of the two coun-
tries’ marginal benefits from the abatement, i.e., pi = bi, i = 1, 2.
However, the two countries could integrate the two domestic permit
markets into a single market to collect gains from eﬃcient cross-border
abatement allocations. Assume that such integration takes place.
Consider the hypothetical situation where, after integration, the two
governments of the two permit markets still issue Qu1 and Q
u
2 emissions
permits, respectively. Then, the permit price would settle somewhere
between b1 and b2, but closer to b1 than to b2. This situation is described
in Figure 2.
Country 1 experiences a permit price drop compared to the unlinked
case while, Country 2 experiences a permit price increase. This implies
increased abatement in Country 2 and a reduced abatement in Country
1 compared to the unlinked case. Country 1 becomes a permit importer,
while Country 2 becomes a permit exporter.
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Unadjusted permit allocations, as shown in Figure 2, do not define
a Nash equilibrium. If Country 2 increases its number of permits, as
indicated in Figure 2, the income from permit exports is increased equal
to the sum of the areas of the hatched rectangle and Rectangle B, minus
the areas of Parallelogram A and the grey parallelogram. Parallelogram
A represents the price drop eﬀect on income from permit sales, while the
grey parallelogram reflects that a permit price drop gives lower domestic
abatement, and consequently, a reduced number of permits is available
for sale. In addition, the grey parallelogram represents reduced abate-
ment costs. Hence, the grey area can be ignored.
The reduced benefits from abatement have to be subtracted (hatched
rectangle). Consequently, Country 2’s change in payoﬀ from an alloca-
tion extension is equal to the diﬀerence in areas of A and B. At the point
where A and B occupy equally-sized areas, then a small country cannot
gain from changing the number of permits.
Correspondingly, Country 1 cannot gain from changing its alloca-
tion when the rectangle with horizontal lines has the same area as the
parallelogram with vertical lines.
In Figure 2, the area of B is significantly larger than the area of A, and
consequently, Country 2 will gain from inflating its permit allocation.
Although it is not equally evident from Figure 2 that Country 1 would
be better oﬀ through the allocation of a smaller number of permits, it is
clear that the situation with unchanged permit allocations is not a Nash
equilibrium.
The steepness of the abatement cost curves plays a crucial role in the
adjustment process towards a Nash equilibrium. As Country 1 increases
the number of permits, then the permit price drops. This is followed
by a reduced abatement in both countries, but the abatement reduction
is largest in Country 1. The abatement reduction moderates the price
drop, and consequently, Country 2 has to carry out a relatively large
allocation increase before the new equilibrium is reached.
Country 1 (the larger country) will adjust the number of allocated
permits downwards. Increased permit price and increased abatement in
both countries follows.
The new equilibrium gives the permit price, p∗, see Figure 1. As is
shown in the next section, the equilibrium price, p∗, is equal to the aver-
age of b1 and b2. The larger country becomes the permit importer, while
the smaller country exports permits. The total amount of emissions is
increased.
This result rests on the assumption that the country with lowest
benefits from abatement has the steepest marginal abatement cost curve.
It is simple to show that instead, if the country with the highest benefits
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had the steeper marginal cost curve, then trading would give lower total
emissions. However, as argued above, the normal case will be that if b1 >
b2, then c1 < c2, i.e., where the smaller country has the steeper marginal
abatement cost function and lower marginal benefits from abatement.
Here, it is important to take into account that the size of countries
varies significantly. Hence, if, for example, a two-digit number of coun-
tries of diﬀerent sizes is involved, then it is very unlikely that we will see a
pattern where the countries with high marginal benefits from abatement
also have the steeper marginal abatement cost functions.
The insight from this is that international emissions trading will tend
to give incentives towards more generous allocations of permits, and
consequently, a reduced total abatement. As total abatement already
at the outset was ineﬃciently low, increased emissions represents an
eﬃciency loss that counteracts the eﬃciency gains from eﬃcient cross-
border abatement allocation.
This section provides an informal introduction to this work’s main
result. The next section analyzes this within an ’n-country’ setting, and
also explores under what conditions linking of emissions trading schemes
will either improve or reverse eﬃciency and how gains and losses are
distributed between the participating countries.
3 A model of transboundary pollution
Consider a world containing n countries, with N = {1, . . . , n} denoting
the set of all countries. Emission abatement is thought of as a pure
public good that benefits each and every country. Each country i’s
periodic payoﬀ is given by
πi = bi
n[
j=1
aj −
ci
2
a2i , i = 1, .., n, (1)
where ai is the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions in country i, the
positive parameter bi represents country i’s marginal benefit from abate-
ment, while (ci/2)a2i represents the total abatement costs of country i,
where ci is a positive parameter.
This model of national payoﬀs is frequently applied in the literature
on international environmental agreements. For example, in Barrett
(1994).
3.1 The non-cooperative solution with domestic per-
mit trading only
Assume that each country has a competitive emissions trading system,
and consequently, that governments do not control abatement directly,
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only the number of allocated permits. The n governments interact in
a one-period simultaneous game by choosing the number of allocated
permits.
This paper considers two cases. In the first case, the governments
introduce independent (unlinked) national emissions trading markets. In
the second case, the governments link the emissions trading market into a
single global market. In this last case, permits issued by one government
are approved in all other countries. In both the linked and the unlinked
cases permit markets are competitive. This subsection considers the case
with n unlinked permit markets, while the next subsection considers the
linked case.
The governments maximize the national payoﬀs taking into account
that their behavior alters the permit price. The national payoﬀ is maxi-
mized when marginal abatement costs equal marginal benefits, i.e. when
bi = ciai, cf. (1). The abatement levels follow:
aui =
bi
ci
. (2)
Hence, irrespective of the other countries’ behavior it is a dominant
strategy to issue
Qui = e
o
i −
bi
ci
(3)
permits, where eoi is the "business as usual" emissions. There is a unique
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium where each government issues permits
Qui . The permit price p
u
i equals the marginal abatement costs ciai.Hence,
from (2) it follows that pui = bi. In the unlinked case, the global permit
supply, Q, is:
Qu =
n[
i=1
eoi −
n[
i=1
bi
ci
. (4)
3.2 The non-cooperative solution with international
permit trading
Consider then the case with international emissions trading meaning
that all governments approve all other countries’ emission permits in
their domestic permit markets. As in Hoel (2005) and Helm (2003), we
take into account that there is no global authority that determines na-
tional allocation of permits. This decision is left to the governments that
act in a simultaneous game, taking into account that their permit alloca-
tions influence the global permit price. Governments enforce the permit
system domestically meaning that domestic emissions after abatement
equals the number of permits held nationally. It follows that the global
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permit supply equals the global emissions:
[
i∈N
Qi =
[
i∈N
ei, (5)
where ei is the emissions from country i. By definition ei = eoi − ai.
Because the permit markets are competitive the permit price p equals
the marginal abatement costs in all countries:
p = ciai. (6)
With linked permit markets, the countries collect a (positive or negative)
permit income p · (Qi + ai − eoi ) . Hence, the national payoﬀs are:
πi = bi
n[
j=1
a− ci
2
a2i + p · (Qi + ai − eoi ) . (7)
where a :=
Sn
j=1 aj. The governments maximize their national payoﬀs
πi with respect to their permit allocations, Qi, subject to the n restric-
tions in (6) and the equilibrium condition of the permit market (5). It
is assumed that all governments take other countries’ permit allocations
as given.
Solving the n countries’ maximization problems simultaneously yields
the unique non—cooperative Nash equilibrium (see appendix):
Q∗i = Q
u
i −
#[
j =i
1
cj
$

bi − b¯

, (8)
where b¯ = 1
n
S
j∈N bj .
In the previous section we argued that there will be a general pattern
where small countries have a small bi and large countries have a large bi.
It follows from (8) that small countries will will tend to increase the allo-
cated number of permits, while large countries will tend to tighten their
allocations when the permit markets become linked, cf. the discussion
in the previous section. Moreover, from (8) we see that the less steep
other countries’ marginal abatement cost curves are, i.e. the smaller
other countries’ cj are, then the more inflated a small country’s permit
allocation is, when the permit markets become linked.
In the linked equilibrium, the permit price equals the average of the
marginal benefits of abatement (see the appendix):
p∗ = b¯, (9)
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and the global permit supply becomes:
Q∗ = Qu +
[
i∈N

1
ci

bi − b¯

. (10)
Define the vectors b :=(b1, ...., bn) and c−1 := ( 1c1 , ....,
1
cn
). Then (10) can
be reformulated to:
Q∗ = Qu + n cov

c−1,b

, (11)
which constitutes the basis for Proposition 1.
3.3 Eﬀects on emissions
Proposition 1 Assume that the n countries link their domestic permit
markets. If bi = bj , for all i, j ∈ N , then the behavior of all countries is
unaltered by linking. Hence, both global abatement and individual coun-
tries’ abatement are unaltered and there are no eﬃciency gains from
linking. If ci = cj for all i, j ∈ N , then global abatement is unaltered
from the unlinked case.
Proof. It follows from (8) that if bi = bj for all i and j, then Q∗i = Q
u
i
for all i ∈ N.With unaltered behavior by all Countries, there cannot be
any eﬃciency gains, and it follows that Q∗ = Qu. If ci = cj for all i and
j then cov (c−1,b) = 0. From (11) it follows that Q∗ = Qu.
Proposition 1 underlines that in a non-cooperative solution, eﬃciency
gains from trading arise when countries value abatement diﬀerently, and
not from diﬀerent abatement cost functions. If countries value abate-
ment equally, i.e. if bi = bj for all i and j, there are no eﬃciency gains
from trading even when abatement cost functions are diﬀerent.
Proposition 2 Assume that the n countries link their domestic permit
markets. If there is a positive (negative) covariance between b and c−1,
then global abatement is lower (higher) in the case with linked permit
markets compared to the unlinked case.
Proof. Proposition 2 follows directly from (11).
Proposition 2 has important implications if it can be argued that
cov (c−1,b) is positive. We have already given some arguments for this,
but we return to the question of whether this is the case below.
To provide intuition to Proposition 2, the two country case is con-
sidered analytically in the following discussion. This supplements the
intuition given in the Section 2.
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Recall that with unlinked permit markets the national governments
issue Qi = eoi − bi/ci permits and the permit prices equal the marginal
benefits of abatement and marginal abatement costs, i.e. pui = bi = ciai.
Assume that the two permit markets are linked, and assume tem-
porarily that the number of allocated permits in both countries is fixed
at the levels of the unlinked case. Private sector behavior will lead to
abatement levels, a1i , that give marginal costs equal to the new, global
permit price that we label p1. Hence, we have that a1i = p
1/ci. Using (3)
and (5) gives:
p1 =
c2
c1 + c2
b1 +
c1
c1 + c2
b2. (12)
Hence, with unchanged allocations the new permit price will settle at
a level between b1 and b2. If c2 > c1,then p1 is closer to b1 than to b2.
The country with the steepest abatement cost curve will experience the
largest price change with unchanged permit allocations.
However, the number of allocated permits fixed at the levels of the
unlinked case is is not a Nash equilibrium. Using that da/dQi = −1 and
that p− ciai = 0, the derivation of (7) gives that:
dπi
dQi
= p− bi − (Qi − ei)
dp
dQi
. (13)
The first term on the right hand side (p) represents the income gain from
an additional permit. In the case of Country 2, this eﬀect is represented
by the sum of the areas of B and the hatched rectangle in Figure 2.
The second term, −bi, represents the reduction of country i’s benefits
following an increase inQi, cf. the area of the hatched rectangle in Figure
2. (Recall that the benefits of abatement are equal to bi (a1 + a2) , and
that da1 + da2 = dQi.) The last term on the right hand side of (13)
represents the income loss from permit sales following the permit price
drop. This last eﬀect is illustrated by the area of A in Figure 2.
The price drop following an increase in Q2 implies a lower abatement
in both countries due to the price drop. Country 2’s reduced abatement
costs are illustrated by the grey area in Figure 2. However, the abate-
ment cost reduction is equal to a corresponding income reduction from
permit for sales due to reduced abatement. Recall here that p = ciai.
Hence, at the margin, these two cost and income eﬀects cancel each
other out. Consequently, in the case of Country 2, an increased permit
allocation is profitable if the area of B is larger than A. Correspondingly,
Country 1 would gain from a reduced permit allocation if the area with
the horizontal lines is larger than area with the vertical lines. (Recall
that here, Country 1 is a permit importer.)
Figures 1 and 2 represent a case where c1 < c2 and b1 > b2, i.e.
13
cov (c−1,b) > 0. According to Proposition 2 this implies that integration
of the two permit markets would give increased emissions. This is in
accordance with the findings in Section 2. Why is this so?
Figure 2 can provide some intuition here. It shows that, at the
outset, when the number of permits is as in the unlinked case, the area
of B is significantly larger than the area of A. Recall that the height of
B represents the diﬀerence between the permit price and Country 2’s
marginal benefit from abatement. Hence, the area of B represents the
additional net benefit to Country 2 of additional permits on the market.
To obtain the net eﬀect on Country 2’s payoﬀ we have to subtract the
area A. The length of A represents Country 2’s permit export, while
the height of A represents the price drop following an increase in Q2. It
follows that the area of A represents the income loss due to the price
drop that follows from the increased number of permits on the market.
Because the area of B is larger than the area of A, Country 2 would
be better oﬀ by increasing its number of permits, cf. the discussion in
Section 2.
As the number of permits is increased the permit price falls, while
the rectangle B moves to the right and becomes lower. Hence, the hight
of B is reduced while A becomes longer. Country 2 will increase its
number of permits until the area of B equals the area of A.
The argument is turned around with respect to Country 1. The
area with horizontal lines represents the diﬀerence between Country 1’s
marginal benefit of abatement and the permit price. The area with
vertical lines represents the import bill increase following the reduced
allocation of permits. Hence, Country 1 would gain by reducing its
number of permits if the area with horizontal lines is larger than the
area with vertical lines. As Country 1’s number of permits is reduced
the permit price increases and the hight of the area with horizontal lines
decreases while the length of the area with vertical lines increases.
Proposition 2 has important implications if cov (c−1,b) is positive.
This is the case if the countries with small marginal benefits from abate-
ment have steep marginal abatement cost functions, and vice versa. Al-
though there will be important exemptions, it is obvious that there will
be a general pattern where large countries have large marginal benefits
from abatement. For example, consider the case that the world consists
of only a single country. This single country’s marginal benefit of abate-
ment would reflect the global collective benefit of abatement. Hence, its
marginal benefit from abatement would be large. On the other hand, if
the world consisted of a large number of small countries, each country
would have relatively small marginal benefits from abatement, reflecting
that a small country will have to endure only a small fraction of total
14
damage from climate change.
Therefore the question is whether there is a general pattern where
small countries have steep marginal abatement cost functions. In the
previous section we argued that this will be the normal case because ag-
gregation of marginal cost curves implies horizontal summation. More-
over, recall that quadratic abatement cost functions can be considered as
approximations to the abatement costs that increase in steps, where each
step in the cost functions represents certain types of projects with de-
fined cost levels. In a small country, there are likely to be fewer projects
within each step compared to a large country.
We do not claim that it will always be the case that the smallest
of two countries has the steeper marginal abatement cost curve and the
lower marginal benefit from abatement. Especially, when the countries
are of the same magnitude, there will be many exceptions to this stylized
rule. However, here, it is important to take into account that the world
contains countries and states of a wide range of sizes. For example, the
seven US states included in the RGGI2, vary from Vermont with a popu-
lation of 623,000 and annual CO2-emissions of approximately 23 million
tonnes, to New York with a population of 19.3 millions and annual CO2-
emissions of 170 million tonnes. Hence, for example, it appears likely
that Vermont has a considerably steeper marginal abatement cost curve
compared to New York. With respect to the marginal benefits from
abatement, an average Vermont citizen should have very high benefits
from abatement compared to an average New York citizen if Vermont’s
marginal benefits from abatement are not to be smaller than the benefits
to New York. Regarding the original Kyoto Protocol it was signed by
countries with a population of more than 300 million (USA) and those
with less than 0.35 million (Iceland).
Of course, there may be important exemptions to a rule saying that
cov (c−1,b) is positive. Nevertheless, we find it likely that cov (c−1,b)
will be positive in most cases. Hence, it is more likely that integration
of permit markets will give increased emissions than the opposite case.
3.4 Eﬀects on gains and losses
In this subsection we study how gains and losses from linking of permit
markets are distributed between participating countries.
Equations (1) and (2) give that
πui = bi
[
j∈N
bj
cj
− 1
2
b2i
ci
. (14)
2Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and
Vermont.
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Equations (6) and (9) shows that a∗i = b¯ci. Upon substitution of (3) and
(8) into (7) gives:
π∗i = b¯2
#[
j∈N
1
cj
− 1
2
1
ci
$
. (15)
This gives:
π∗i − πui =
#
b¯
[
j∈N
b¯
cj
− bi
[
j∈N
bj
cj
$
+
1
2

b2i
ci
− b¯
2
ci

(16)
Consider the case where bi > b¯ and cov (c−1,b) ≥ 0. Then the ex-
pression in the first bracket on the right hand side of (16) is negative.
However, the second bracket is positive. Hence, in general, we cannot
state whether country i will lose or win from linking although we assume
that bi > b¯ and cov (c−1,b) > 0.
To simplify the discussion, consider the two country case. Then, we
have:
π∗1 − πu1 =

b1 − b2
8c2c1

(b1 (2c1 − 3c2)− b2 (2c1 + c2)) (17)
π∗2 − πu2 =

b1 − b2
8c1c2

(b1 (c1 + 2c2) + b2 (3c1 − 2c2)) (18)
Then we could state the following result:
Proposition 3 Assume that n = 2, and that b1 > b2. Then, Country 2
will always gain from linking. Country 1 will gain from linking, if and
only if:
c1 >

1 +
b1 + 3b2
2 (b1 − b2)

c2.
Proof. The Proposition follows directly from (17) and (18).
From Proposition 3 it follows that when b1 > b2 in the two country
case, Country 1 will lose from linking when c1 < c2, and even in some
cases where c1 > c2. This implies that in all cases where cov (c−1,b) is
positive, i.e. in all cases where emissions are increased by linking, and
even in some cases where cov (c−1,b) is negative, the country with the
largest benefit from abatement will lose from linking.
Here, our result diﬀers from the a result in Helm’s Proposition 4.
Helm claims that "even if overall emissions are higher with trading, all
countries may consent to it because their welfare without trading would
be lower" (Helm, 2003, p. 2744). Although Helm refers to the n-country
case, the somewhat unclear proof is based on the two country case.
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3.5 Eﬀects on eﬃciency
The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium with unlinked permit markets
is not Pareto eﬃcient because the abatement levels are ineﬃciently
low, and abatement allocations are not cost-eﬀectively distributed across
countries. With fixed allocations, linking would obviously imply an in-
creased eﬃciency. However, it is an open question whether total ef-
ficiency is improved if an ineﬃciently low abatement level is reduced
further.
Define:
πu : =
[
i∈N
πui ,
π∗ : =
[
i∈N
π∗i .
Using (14) gives:
πu =
n[
i=1
bi
#
n[
j=1
bj
cj
$
− 1
2
n[
i=1
(bi)
2
ci
. (19)
Using (15) gives:
π∗ =

n− 1
2

b¯2
#
n[
j=1
1
cj
$
. (20)
It follows that
π∗ − πu = 1
2
n[
i=1
b2i
ci
−
n[
i=1
bi
#
n[
j=1
bj
cj
$
+

n− 1
2

b¯2
#
n[
j=1
1
cj
$
(21)
The right hand side of (21) could be either positive or negative. Hence,
with no restrictions on the relationship between bi and ci there can be
either an eﬃciency gain or loss from linking. However, we can state the
following result:
Proposition 4 Assume that all countries have equal marginal benefits
from abatement, i.e. that bi = bj , ∀i, j ∈ N. Then, the overall eﬃciency
is unchanged by linking.
Proof. Insert bi = bj , ∀i, j ∈ N into (21). Then it follows that πu = π∗.
Proposition 4 follows from (8), which implies that if bi = bj, ∀i, j ∈ N
, then allocations in all countries are unaltered from the unlinked case.
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Moreover, because pui = bi, and p
∗ = b¯, it follows that there will be no
permit trade if bi = bj , ∀i, j ∈ N.
Consider again the two country case. From (21) we have the eﬀect
on eﬃciency:
π∗ − πu = 1
8c1c2
(b1 − b2) (3b1c1 − b1c2 − 3b2c2 + b2c1) (22)
Now we are ready to state the following result:
Proposition 5 Consider the two country case. Assume that b1 > b2.
Then, eﬃciency will be improved by linking if, and only if:
c1 >

1− 2 (b1 − b2)
3b1 + b2

c2.
Proof. Proposition 5 follows directly from (22).
3.6 Summing up results on emissions, gains and
losses and eﬃciency
In the n-country case, it is diﬃcult to provide explicit results regarding
which countries will lose, and which countries will gain from linking and
how eﬃciency will be aﬀected. However, the definite results in the two
country case can serve as an indicator on how linking of permit markets
may aﬀect both emissions, incentives, gains, losses, and eﬃciency.
Figure 5 provides an overview of our findings regarding the two coun-
try case when b1 > b2. If c1 < c2, then cov (c−1,b) > 0, and it fol-
lows from (11) and Proposition 2 that linking gives increased emissions.
Moreover, if
c1 <

1− 2 (b1 − b2)
3b1 + b2

c2, (23)
then there will be an eﬃciency loss.
In the interval

1− 2 (b1 − b2)
3b1 + b2

c2 < c1 <

1 +
b1 + 3b2
2 (b1 − b2)

c2, (24)
Country 1 will lose while Country 2 will profit from linking. Only if
c1 >

1 +
b1 + 3b2
2 (b1 − b2)

c2, (25)
will both countries profit from linking.
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Country 1 loses, 
country 2 gains. Both countries gain.
Increased emissions Reduced emissions
Improved efficiency. Reduced efficiency. 
Figure 3: Illustrates the two country case when b1 > b2 and considers
how the relationship between the parameters influences gains, losses,
emissions, and the overall eﬃciency.
3.7 Eﬃciency in a model with identical firms
To investigate further the relationship between linking of permit markets
and eﬃciency, this section introduces a more restrictive model. As in
Golombek and Hoel (2008), we assume that each country has a varying
number of identical firms mi. A firm j in country i has abatement costs:
γ
2
(aji)
2 , (26)
where γ is a positive parameter and aji is the abatement carried out by
the firm. If the abatement is carried out eﬃciently, country i now has
abatement costs:
min
aij
%
mi[
j=1
γ
2
(aij)
2
&
=
γ
2mi
a2i . (27)
Moreover, we assume that the benefits that countries gain from the
abatement are proportional to the size of their economy reflected by their
respective numbers of firms. Then, country i has the following benefit
from abatement:
βmia, (28)
where β is a positive parameter.
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It follows that:
bi=miβ, (29a)
ci= γ/mi. (29b)
From (7), (6) and (5) we have:
πu= β
2
γ
#
n[
i=1
mi
#
n[
j=1
m2j
$
− 1
2
n[
i=1
m3i
$
, (30)
π∗=

n− 1
2

β2
γn2
#
n[
i=1
mi
$3
. (31)
Define:
M1 : =
n[
i=1
mi, (32)
M2 : =
n[
i=1
m2i , (33)
M3 : =
n[
i=1
m3i . (34)
It follows that:
π∗ − πu = β
2
2γ

2n− 1
n2
M31 − 2M1M2 +M3

(35)
Now we are ready to state the following result:
Proposition 6 Assume that each country has mi identical firms with
abatement costs (γ/2) (aji)2 , and assume that the countries’ marginal
benefits of abatement are proportional to the numbers of firms in the
diﬀerent countries, such that bi = miβ. Assume that at least two of the
n countries are diﬀerent, i.e., that mi 9= mj, i, j ∈ N. If the n countries
link their originally unlinked domestic permit markets, then the eﬃciency
is reduced.
Proof. Proposition 3 claims that if there exists an i and j, such that
mi 9= mj , i, j ∈ N then πu > π∗. The proof is carried out by induction.
First, consider the two country case. It follows from (35) that in the two
country case we have:
π∗ − πu = −1
4
(m1 +m2) (m2 −m1)2 (36)
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It follows that in the n = 2 case π∗ < πu if m1 9= m2, m1 > 0, m2 > 0.
Hence, linkage of Country 1 and Country 2 gives a smaller total payoﬀ
π∗1,2 compared to the unlinked payoﬀ πu1,2 if m1 9= m2.
The n country case follows directly by an iterative use of the n = 2
case. To see this, letm = (m1, ...mn) and consider first linkage of country
1 and 2. From the n = 2 case above we know that
πu1,...n = πu1,2 + πu3,..n ≥ π∗1,2;3...n := π∗1,2 + πu3,..n (37)
This inequality is strict if m1 9= m2.
Define πu1¯,2¯ as the payoﬀ of two equally sized countries with m¯1 =
m¯2 = 1/2(m1 +m2). It follows directly from (36) that π∗1,2;3...n = πu1¯,2¯ +
πu3,..n . In short, we have proved the following:
πu1,...n = πu1,2 + πu3,..n ≥ π∗1,2 + πu3,..n = πu1¯,2¯ + πu3,..n = πu1¯,2¯,3...n. (38)
That is πu1,...n, which corresponds to the payoﬀ of m = (m1, ...mn), is at
least the payoﬀ of m´ = (m¯1, m¯2,m3...mn). Now the result follows from
iteration of this step: Apply the same reasoning to any two countries in
m´ = (m¯1, m¯2,m3...mn) (say m¯2 and m3), call this πu1¯,2¯,3¯,4,...n, and get a
chain of inequalities:
πu1,...n ≥ πu1¯,2¯,3...n ≥ πu1¯,2¯,3¯,4...n ≥ πu1¯,2¯,3¯,4¯,5...n ≥ ... (39)
This chain of converges to πu
1´,...n´
where m´ = (m´1, ...m´n) where m´i =
1/n
S
mi. In other words,
πu1,...n ≥ πu1´,...n´ = π
∗
1´,...n´
(40)
where the final equality stems from that in the case of m´i = 1/n
S
mi is
πu
1´,...n´
= π∗
1´,...n´
which is trivial to check. In fact, since mi 9= mj we know
that (at least one) of the inequalities in the chain is strict, and we know
that the inequality:
πu1,...n > πu1´,...n´ = π
∗
1´,...n´
(41)
is strict.
Some intuition to Proposition 6 can be reached by recalling that it
follows from (35) that πu = π∗ if mi = mj for all i and j in N. Hence,
the eﬃciency in the linked case is the same as in the the unlinked case
when the countries are of equal size. At the same time, (31) shows
that eﬃciency in the linked case is independent of the relative size of
the countries. However, in the unlinked case, the relative size of the
countries matters.
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4 Conclusions
Linking of emissions trading schemes can release eﬃciency gains. How-
ever, this paper has proved that such linking is likely to increase total
emissions. The reason is that international emissions trading is likely
to provide incentive structures where governments of small countries
will have incentives towards more generous allocation of permits while
governments of large countries will have incentives to tighten up their
allocations. However, more generous allocations from the small coun-
tries are likely to outdo the allocation reductions from larger countries’,
and, consequently there will be a reduced total abatement.
A second finding is that large countries, are likely to lose when their
permit markets are linked to the permit markets of smaller countries
with lower benefits from abatement.
It remains uncertain how linking of emissions trading schemes will
aﬀect the overall eﬃciency. We conclude that eﬃciency may increase or
decrease when permit markets are linked, as found in Helm (2003). Link-
ing will give more eﬃcient allocation of abatement eﬀorts. On the other
hand, an ineﬃciently low abatement level is likely to be even lower. This
represents an eﬃciency loss. The net eﬀect on eﬃciency is uncertain.
The question of eﬃciency was analysed using a more restrictive model.
In the restrictive model, the emissions were caused by a set of identical
firms. The number of firms varied among countries, and the countries’
benefits from abatement are assumed to be proportional to their number
of firms. Within this model international emissions trading reduces both
global abatement and eﬃciency.
Our conclusion is that linking of national emission trading schemes
will turn out to be less attractive in future in international climate policy
than often assumed. Not least important is the result that large countries
are likely to experience reduced payoﬀs, and therefore, will be less willing
to enter into this type of cooperation.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the non-cooperative Nash equi-
librium
The n governments’ maximization problems with linked permit markets
are:
max
Qi
πi= bi(
[
j∈N
aj)−
ci
2
a2i + p(
[
j∈N
Qj) · (Qi − eoi + ai) (42)
s.t.
cjaj = p(
[
j∈N
Qj), ∀j ∈ N, (43)
(44)[
j∈N
Qj =
[
j∈N
e0j −
[
j∈N
aj . (45)
Substitution from (6) the equilibrium condition becomes:
[
j∈N
Qj =
[
j∈N
e0j − p(
[
j∈N
Qj) ·
[
j∈N
1
cj
. (46)
Defining
α = − 1S
j∈N
1
cj
, (47)
it follows from (6) and (5) that the equilibrium permit price is:
p(
[
j∈N
Qj) = α
#[
j∈N
Qj −
[
j∈N
e0j
$
. (48)
Substitution from (6) into (7), the payoﬀ become:
πi = bip
[
j∈N
1
cj
− ci
2

p
ci
2
+ p

Qi − eoi +
p
ci

. (49)
Upon substitution from (47) we have:
πi =

Qi − eoi −
bi
α

p +
1
2ci
p2. (50)
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Hence, we have:
dπi
dQi
= p+

Qi − eoi −
bi
α

dp
dQi
+
p
ci
dp
dQi
. (51)
It follows from (48) that:
dp
dQi
= α. (52)
Hence, we have:
dπi
dQi
= p +

Qi − eoi −
bi
α

α+ p
ci
α. (53)
Substitution from (48) and rewriting give that:
dπi
dQi
= αQi − bi − αeoi +

α+ α
2
ci
#[
j∈N
Qj −
[
j∈N
ej
$
. (54)
The first order conditions dπi/dQi = 0 yields the reaction curve of coun-
try i:
Qi =
1
2α+ α2
ci
#
bi + αeoi −

α+ α
2
ci
#[
j =i
Qj −
[
j∈N
e0j
$$
, (55)
which could be rewritten to:
Qi = e1 +
c1b1
α (α+ 2c1)
− α+ c1α+ 2c1
#[
j =1
Qj − eoi
$
. (56)
(56) represents the n reaction curves and constitutes n equations in the n
unknown variables Qj, j = 1, .., n. Solving these n equations, using that
Qui = e
o
i − aui and substituting from (47) gives the number of permits
allocated by the government of country i in the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium in the non-cooperative case with linked permit markets:
Q∗i = Q
u
i −
#[
j =i
1
cj
$#
bi −
1
n
[
j
bj
$
. (57)
It should here be added that derivation of (57) is not straightforward.
We applied (56) to the three and four country cases and used the results
to find the solution of the n-country case.
The aggregate allocation Q∗ given in (10) follows by summing from
(57).
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A.2 Derivation of the permit price
In the following it will be shown that p = b¯. Insert (10) into (48):
p = α
#[
i∈N
Qui +
[
i∈N
%
1
ci
#
bi −
1
n
[
j
bj
$&
−
[
j∈N
eoj
$
(58)
Using that Qui = e
o
i − aui and some rewriting gives that p = b¯.
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